I have been reading lots of coverage and the notes from
@Scepticalscribe here. It seems to me that there are two major issues with the official Afghan military. First, they’ve become reliant on the Americans. Second, they don’t seem to have a strong loyalty to the current government, which has a bad reputation for corruption. Seems like they’d rather take their chances with a Taliban government than give up their lives to defend the current leaders.
I'm also very struck by the fact that - leaving the regular forces (ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces) aside - that the private militias, the private armies - have also (completely) collapsed.
These militias, or armies, were supposedly exceedingly strong, and well equipped, and extremely loyal to their respective "warlords" or "strongmen" - people such as Atta Noor and General Dostum in Mazar-i-Sharif, and Ismail Khan in Herat.
In fact, these forces, these militias, private armies, which were answerable to nobody other than these/their respective strongmen/warlords, and which served as the source of their (the warlords) power - ensuring their military and political independence from any administration based in Kabul, - these regions were in some ways quasi independent fiefdoms at times, an independence preserved by the existence of these private militias, or armies, - failed to fight, or offer resistance, in any way seriously to the threat posed by the Taliban, whereas their very existence had ensured that the writ of Kabul didn't always run in those regions.
And yes, I am also struck by the fact that Ismail Khan surrendered (or was captured) in Herat, while Atta Noor, and Dostum both fled across the border to Uzbekistan.
So, the collapse is not simply that of an unpaid and poorly equipped national security force (and poorly motivated - though some, in fairness, fought desperately hard until they had run out of ammunition, the promised logistical and military and other support from Kabul never arriving), but is also - very strikingly - that of the supposedly well equipped, terrifying (and independent) private armies, or militias, answerable to the regional "strongmen" or "warlords", in areas that were never home to the Taliban, loathed the Taliban, had fought against them and opposed them in the 1990s.