Russia-Ukraine

[SuperMatt]

My impression is that Biden is engaged with both NATO and Russia, yes?

Very much so…

 

[Eric]

My impression is that Biden is engaged with both NATO and Russia, yes?

Yes, I think that will happen as well. The question is will we do anything more than slap Putin with meaningless sanctions and empty warnings and I think the clear answer is no.

 

[Huntn]

Yes, I think that will happen as well. The question is will we do anything more than slap Putin with meaningless sanctions and empty warnings and I think the clear answer is no.

I’ve heard as a theory that sanctions hurt the people which ultimately undermines Putin’s grasp of power, now how long does it take? The USSR did crumble eventually…

 

[Chew Toy McCoy]

Truth. No nation enters another nation's conflict for purely humanitarian reasons and if an area is of no strategic value, the chances of us intervening are slim to nil (not that I necessarily think we should be intervening, though I do think it's a good idea to prevent genocide if at all possible).

We tend to only go where we can definitively crush the enemy. And then we still fuck that up. Well, unless you're a war profiteer. By that metric it's an overwhelming almost inexplicable success.

 

[SuperMatt]

Yes, I think that will happen as well. The question is will we do anything more than slap Putin with meaningless sanctions and empty warnings and I think the clear answer is no.

Putin knows it too. Europe is pulling the covers over their proverbial heads and hoping the monster goes away. America isn’t going to act unilaterally. So yeah, Putin probably gets to annex at least part of Ukraine. I believe Trump’s anti-NATO talk and behavior helped get us to this point. Is Trump just a xenophobe who thinks European NATO countries should take care of themselves? Or was he working with Putin? We will probably never know.

 

[Huntn]

We tend to only go where we can definitively crush the enemy. And then we still fuck that up. Well, unless you're a war profiteer. By that metric it's an overwhelming almost inexplicable success.

Eisenhower warned of the Military Industrial Complex that has come to be.

 

[Chew Toy McCoy]

Putin knows it too. Europe is pulling the covers over their proverbial heads and hoping the monster goes away. America isn’t going to act unilaterally. So yeah, Putin probably gets to annex at least part of Ukraine. I believe Trump’s anti-NATO talk and behavior helped get us to this point. Is Trump just a xenophobe who thinks European NATO countries should take care of themselves? Or was he working with Putin? We will probably never know.

Trump was Putin's bitch. To say he was "working with" you'd really have to push the definition of "manipulated by". Trump is a strong man's weak man. He's a clown in every peer group he's ever tried to insert himself in. Businessman, ladies man, entertainer, politician... a running joke across the board to everybody except the bottom feeders with similar aspirations and an overinflated sense of importance.

 

[User.168]

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[Deleted member 215]

Putin went for Crimea and now likely Luhansk and Donetsk because these regions are majority-Russian speaking and about 40% ethnically Russian. I hate to say it, but a lot of people in these regions would be happy to join Russia. The same can’t be said for the rest of Ukraine, but I think Putin could absolutely win over these border provinces (which have already declared themselves to be unrecognized separatist states).

 

[User.168]

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[Deleted member 215]

At least for Donetsk, I read that around 27% of the population favored joining Russia in 2014 and around 40% favored maintaining a separatist state. It’s not a majority, but there is a separatist/annexing movement in the Donbas that at least a quarter of the population there has supported. I don’t think the same can be said for Texas and New Mexico.

Apparently the current president of Ukraine is open to another referendum in the region.

Ukrainian president does not exclude referendum on Crimea and Donbass

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Friday said he did not exclude holding a referendum on the future status of war-torn eastern Ukraine and the Crimea peninsula annexed by Russia in 2014.

www.reuters.com

 

[Scepticalscribe]

Europe is reluctant to get involved too. It feels like NATO leaders completely forgot the lessons of WWII. Sure, let Putin have Ukraine… oh he wants Romania and Poland too? Well, we don’t want a war, so let’s appease him.

Romania and Poland are protected by treaties under international law in a way that Ukraine is not.

For one thing, both countries are members of the EU; Ukraine is not.

For another, and of equal relevance in this context - or discussion - is the fact that both Poland and Romania are members of NATO; again, Ukraine is not.

While the rhetoric (and tone and temperature) of the current discourse does bear an unsettling resemblance to the political (and military) noise that preceded the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008, I do not think that it is possible for Russia to win a war in Ukraine.

Or, rather, to be more precise, I do not believe that it will not be possible for Russia to hold the western half of the country, where they are loathed. In the east - the regions they currently control or influence - matters are different.

And Crimea is a place apart, and is culturally dramatically different from both east and west Ukraine.

In any case, there, (in Crimea), Russia's interest is, I believe, strategic, namely, it is the current expression of the old desire - a desire dating from the time Catherine the Great was on the throne in the late 18th century, - to have access to a (permanent) warm water port.

However, in the current situation, I think that Russia hopes to exert sufficient pressure (political and military) to (permanently) divide, or split, Ukraine, (which is, bear in mind, a profoundly unstable political entity, and has been, ever since Stalin changed the shape and location - the very geography - of the country at the end of WW2, by absorbing part of what used to be east Ukraine into Russia proper, and compensating for this by shifting the borders of what we call Ukraine several hundred kms west).

This has left Ukraine with (at least) two separate and quite distinct cultures, which are now reflected in their political preferences and wider socio-economic cultures: The one lying in the east of the country speaks Russian, uses the Cyrillic alphabet, identifies as "Slavic", and considers itself part of the Orthodox (Christian) community, (and was heavily industrialised in Soviet times), whereas the part of Ukraine that lies to the west, (some of which once used to be part of the Habsburg Empire - one of the elections I observed in the country took me - quite literally - right up to the Hungarian border), speaks Ukrainian, (even the alphabet differs from the Cyrillic used to write Russian), has a Catholic (along with a version of Orthodox Christianity close to Catholicism) culture, and identifies (strongly) with central and eastern Europe, viewing itself (with some justification) as "European". Even their respective histories and heroes differ, and their respective narratives of what happened in the country called "Ukraine" during WW2 differ dramatically.

Therefore, the eventual outcome I envisage, is that of two Ukraines, where the western part will not be able to proceed with any sort of integration into the 'western' world, or western political and economic (EU), and military (NATO) alliances, unless they accept (and recognise) the (permanent) division of the country, which is something that they will deem unpalatable.

This tactic has already been applied - very successfully - in both Georgia and Moldova. For, this is what Russia has already achieved with both Georgia and Moldova, as both countries are now permanently divided, in de facto terms, if not (yet) de jure.

And, politically, both countries are in a state of stasis, stuck in a kind of political amber, resulting in something akin to a 'congealed', rather than a 'frozen' conflict, because the price of change (recognise the 'new' boundaries) is unacceptable and unpalatable domestically.

In other words, Russia is engineering an appalling dilemma: Territorial integrity (which is not possible with part of your population profoundly alienated) or national sovereignty (with the pro-Russian section of your population - and the territories that come with them, permanently hived off). Because to have both will not be possible under current conditions. Not if you hope to achieve political stability.

And, for local political elites to openly accept these divisions would amount to political suicide, (for reasons of national pride, political optics - who wants to be the premier who is seen, historically, to have "sacrificed" some of the sacred national territories?), never mind that the recognition of such divisions would serve to stabilise the country, - as unsettled groups with conflicted and divided loyalties are no longer a part of the state - but at an unacceptable political cost.

In any case, - and this is key - the EU (and NATO) will not accept any sort of applications for membership, or Membership Action Plans, (the so-called road MAP for possible future membership), from countries with contested borders, and boundaries that have not been agreed by all of the contesting parties to the disputes in question.

Now, for Russia, - and I have written this before - interest in Ukraine goes far beyond mere restoration of the Tsarist (or Soviet) Imperium, or successfully wielding influence or projecting power in the "Near Abroad", or taking advantage of western distractions, with Covid or something similar, or seeking to deflect or distract domestic attention from domestic concerns - though all of these may also play a motivating role in Russia's actions.

To Russians, Ukraine is the cradle of their culture and civilisation. This tie is emotional, (cultural, religious) - a matter of core cultural identity - as much as political or nostalgic.

(And, on this topic, - restoring influence to areas where it is deemed appropriate to be able to wield such influence, in the so-called "Near Abroad" - I will merely observe that the western silence on recent events in Kazakhstan is telling).

Nevertheless, it is my opinion that Ukraine is the one place in the former Russian (and Soviet) Imperium where Russia will go to the absolute wire.

This is for reasons of cultural and national and religious (they are all linked) identity: Russians see Ukraine as the cradle of their culture, identity and civilisation.

Let us recall that the ancestor state of Russia, where Prince Vladimir accepted the Christian faith (what became Orthodox Christianity) on behalf of his people in 988, went by the name of "Kievan Rus" - and we would do well to remember this.

In any case, I would argue that Russia is seeking to engineer conditions for a possible conflict that would lead to a (permanent) division of the country.

Now, it will be interesting to see where the Russian will seek to draw the line of this division.

My guess is that they may wish to include Kiev (Kyiv), which, frankly, will serve to stymie any attempt at political change (in Ukraine) for a few decades, as change (the kind of change that dreams of NATO or the EU membership) will not be possible unless the new political boundaries (the very word 'border' will be contested) are recognised and accepted.

And the capital of a "west" Ukraine may well lie elsewhere than in Kyiv, although I would expect to see that issue contested very strongly.

 

[yaxomoxay]

I’ll get into this thread with my now rarely worn Kissingerian hat.

To answer the question in the title: yes.

Europe will do nothing.
NATO will do nothing.
The US will do nothing, and even made up the “incursion vs invasion” difference to feel absolved (aka “Green light Mr Putin, but go easy please).

 

[Thomas Veil]

That "smaller incursion/larger incursion" talk of Biden's really didn't help; it just made us look like we'd give in easily. Bad mistake on Joe's part.

With regard to sanctions...when this whole thing started a few weeks ago I read an article which suggested Biden and the State Department were looking at going further than what's been done before. Something like trying to get the world community to lock up Russia's financial assets around the globe. That would be really interesting if it were to happen, not just because Putin would probably be furious, but because if it didn't hurt them much we'd probably get a fair idea of how much liquidity they've got hidden away in shady offshore accounts.

I’ve heard as a theory that sanctions hurt the people which ultimately undermines Putin’s grasp of power, now how long does it take? The USSR did crumble eventually…

IIRC, that was largely because our military buildup made them spend a lot of money on their military buildup, a situation which was not sustainable for them. I don't know that I'd hold out hope for a popular revolt, although that would be terrific.

I believe Trump’s anti-NATO talk and behavior helped get us to this point.

Trump was Putin's bitch.

This and this. And now that he's brimming with confidence, I don't think Putin believes that Biden has the will to respond in any meaningful way.

Therefore, the eventual outcome I envisage, is that of two Ukraines, where the western part will not be able to proceed with any sort of integration into the 'western' world, or western political and economic (EU), and military (NATO) alliances, unless they accept (and recognise) the (permanent) division of the country, which is something that they will deem unpalatable.

I do understand the reason Ukraine isn't already a NATO member--namely not wanting to prod the bear, so to speak. But at the moment that philosophy looks somewhat naive. I'm not sure what Russia's reaction would've been had we admitted Ukraine to NATO, but had we done so, I really can't see how we'd be where we are today.

If what you suggest comes to pass and we end up with two Ukraines, perhaps we should go ahead and include "Western Ukraine" in the alliance. Again, Putin would throw a fit, but doing nothing will probably ensure that in ten years there won't be a "Western Ukraine" either. It'll be all Putin's, and he'll be on NATO's doorstep anyway. If we take the initiative and admit Ukraine (or whatever's left of it), Putin has nobody to blame but himself. He could've left well enough alone, but noooooo...

 

[User.168]

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[ericwn]

I’ll get into this thread with my now rarely worn Kissingerian hat.

To answer the question in the title: yes.

Europe will do nothing.
NATO will do nothing.
The US will do nothing, and even made up the “incursion vs invasion” difference to feel absolved (aka “Green light Mr Putin, but go easy please).

I’m afraid you’re spot on.

 

[AG_PhamD]

Romania and Poland are protected by treaties under international law in a way that Ukraine is not.

For one thing, both countries are members of the EU; Ukraine is not.

For another, and of equal relevance in this context - or discussion - is the fact that both Poland and Romania are members of NATO; again, Ukraine is not.

While the rhetoric (and tone and temperature) of the current discourse does bear an unsettling resemblance to the political (and military) noise that preceded the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008, I do not think that it is possible for Russia to win a war in Ukraine.

Or, rather, to be more precise, I do not believe that it will not be possible for Russia to hold the western half of the country, where they are loathed. In the east - the regions they currently control or influence - matters are different.

And Crimea is a place apart, and is culturally dramatically different from both east and west Ukraine.

In any case, there, (in Crimea), Russia's interest is, I believe, strategic, namely, it is the current expression of the old desire - a desire dating from the time Catherine the Great was on the throne in the late 18th century, - to have access to a (permanent) warm water port.

However, in the current situation, I think that Russia hopes to exert sufficient pressure (political and military) to (permanently) divide, or split, Ukraine, (which is, bear in mind, a profoundly unstable political entity, and has been, ever since Stalin changed the shape and location of the country at the end of WW2, by absorbing part of what used to be east Ukraine into Russia proper, and by compensating for this by shifting the borders of what we call Ukraine several hundred kms west).

Therefore, the eventual outcome I envisage, is that of two Ukraines, where the western part will not be able to proceed with any sort of integration into the 'western' world, or western political and economic (EU), and military (NATO) alliances, unless they accept (and recognise) the (permanent) division of the country, which is something that they will deem unpalatable.

This tactic has already been applied - very successfully - in both Georgia and Moldova. For this is what Russia has already achieved with both Georgia and Moldova, as both countries are now permanently divided, in de facto terms, if not (yet) de jure.

And, politically, both countries are in a state of stasis, stuck in a kind of political amber, resulting in something akin to a 'congealed', rather than a 'frozen' conflict, because the price of change (recognise the 'new' boundaries) is unacceptable and unpalatable domestically.

In other words, Russia is engineering an appalling dilemma: Territorial integrity (which is not possible with alienated populations) or national sovereignty (with the pro-Russian section of your population - and the territories that come with them, permanently hived off). Because to have both will not be possible under current conditions. Not if you hope to achieve political stability.

And, for local political elites to openly accept these divisions would amount to political suicide, (for reasons of national pride, political optics - who wants to be the premier who is seen, historically, to have "sacrificed" some of the sacred national territories?), never mind that the recognition of such divisions would serve to stabilise the country, - as unsettled groups with conflicted and divided loyalties are no longer a part of the state - but at an unacceptable political cost.

In any case, - and this is key - the EU (and NATO) will not accept any sort of applications for membership, or Membership Action Plans, (the so-called road MAP for possible future membership), from countries with contested borders, and boundaries that have not been agreed by all of the contesting parties to the disputes in question.

Now, for Russia, - and I have written this before - interest in Ukraine goes far beyond mere restoration of the Tsarist (or Soviet) Imperium, or successfully wielding influence or projecting power in the "Near Abroad", or taking advantage of western distractions, with Covid or something similar, or seeking to deflect or distract from domestic concerns - though all of these may also play a motivating role in Russia's actions.

To Russians, Ukraine is the cradle of their culture and civilisation. This tie is emotional, (cultural, religious) - a matter of core cultural identity - as much as political or nostalgic.

(And, on this topic, - restoring influence to areas where it is deemed appropriate to be able to wield such influence, in the so-called "Near Abroad" - I will merely observe that western silence on recent events in Kazakhstan is telling).

It is my opinion that Ukraine is the one place in the former Russian (and Soviet) Imperium where Russia will go to the absolute wire.

This is for reasons of cultural and national and religious (they are all linked) identity: Russians see Ukraine as the cradle of their culture, identity and civilisation.

Let us recall that the ancestor state of Russia, where Prince Vladimir accepted the Christian faith (what became Orthodox Christianity) on behalf of his people in 988, went by the name of "Kievan Rus" - and we would do well to remember this.

In any case, I would argue that Russia is seeking to engineer conditions for a possible conflict that would lead to a (permanent) division of the country.

Now, it will be interesting to see where the Russian will seek to draw the line of this division.

My guess is that they may wish to include Kiev (Kyiv), which, frankly, will serve to stymie any attempt at political change (in Ukraine) for a few decades, as change (the kind of change that dreams of NATO or the EU membership) will not be possible unless the new political boundaries (the very word 'border' will be contested) are recognised and accepted.

And the capital of a "west" Ukraine may well lie elsewhere than in Kyiv, although I would expect to see that issue contested very strongly.

Great post, this is the most through and frankly most objective thing I’ve read on this topic. Makes a lot of sense. Thank you!

 

[AG_PhamD]

I’ll get into this thread with my now rarely worn Kissingerian hat.

To answer the question in the title: yes.

Europe will do nothing.
NATO will do nothing.
The US will do nothing, and even made up the “incursion vs invasion” difference to feel absolved (aka “Green light Mr Putin, but go easy please).

The US and the UK are supplying relatively sophisticated weaponry, which hasn’t always been the case. So that’s not nothing. But I don’t think anyone in the West is going to shed blood for Ukraine.

It’ll be interesting to see how the Biden administration handles this. I think they are pretty desperate for a “win” in something. An invasion of Ukraine will look really bad for Biden, an invasion without consequences would probably be much worse.

On the other hand, the EU, especially Germany, is dependent on Russian natural gas. Russia could cut off that supply which would cause problems for everyone (Russia very much included, who knows if they’re willing to take that sacrifice).

Based on Biden’s history of appeasement, it kinda makes me think he’d do nothing if an invasion occurs. Americans will not be happy about that as it reflects poorly as our status as a world power- the withdrawal from Afghanistan was perceived as humiliating.

 

[Huntn]

The US and the UK are supplying relatively sophisticated weaponry, which hasn’t always been the case. So that’s not nothing. But I don’t think anyone in the West is going to shed blood for Ukraine.

It’ll be interesting to see how the Biden administration handles this. I think they are pretty desperate for a “win” in something. An invasion of Ukraine will look really bad for Biden, an invasion without consequences would probably be much worse.

On the other hand, the EU, especially Germany, is dependent on Russian natural gas. Russia could cut off that supply which would cause problems for everyone (Russia very much included, who knows if they’re willing to take that sacrifice).

Based on Biden’s history of appeasement, it kinda makes me think he’d do nothing if an invasion occurs. Americans will not be happy about that as it reflects poorly as our status as a world power- the withdrawal from Afghanistan was perceived as humiliating.

Regarding Afghanistan I wonder how it would have looked politically if Trump had been there to finish out his version? We know it would have been approval from the GOP No matter how bleak. My understanding is that a lot of what a Biden did was of what took place on Trump's watch, not that Biden liked it, but more of the die has been cast.

I’d also like to know what the military told Biden, hang in there or cut bait? It’s not as if this was good for our economic stability, an unending occupation among a group of people who don’t want to be like us. Besides, our military budget may just end up bankrupting us or all our bridges will fall down. And for anyone with long term memory, many were against invading both Afganistan and Iraq something that happened under… a Republican President, with cheering Republicans.

 

[Scepticalscribe]

I do understand the reason Ukraine isn't already a NATO member--namely not wanting to prod the bear, so to speak. But at the moment that philosophy looks somewhat naive. I'm not sure what Russia's reaction would've been had we admitted Ukraine to NATO, but had we done so, I really can't see how we'd be where we are today.

Not wanting to "prod the bear" was only a part of this.

Remember, the "bear" was comatose, deep in hibernation, in the 1990s: Their currency - the rouble - had completely collapsed and Russia had defaulted on its debts as recently as 1998 - and yet, nobody, anywhere, was of the opinion that Ukraine should be encouraged to apply for membership of any western economic, military or political body, because of conditions (not least stratospheric corruption) within Ukraine itself.

Notwithstanding that, I think that the "colour revolutions" in both Georgia (late 2003) and Ukraine (2004-2005) profoundly shocked Mr Putin, and brought about a radical transformation in his thinking on matters regarding Russia's relations with some of the countries in the "Near Abroad" (i.e. former Soviet states, especially those in Europe with some sort of Slavic culture).

However, to my mind, the really important event - the ripples of which are still felt - occurred in 2008, and it was not the conflict between Russia and Georgia.

Rather, it was the recognition - by the west - of Kosovo when it declared independence from Serbia, in February, 2008.

This is important because it was the first time since the Second World War that a functioning, relatively stable, peaceful, democratic, sovereign state (which Serbia currently is, - and which it was, in 2008), was dismembered - or divided - against its will.

At the time, Russia signalled strong disapproval, and vehement disagreement, and stated, moreover, that it viewed this action as a "red line" making it clear that it would challenge (militarily, if necessary), any future actions of a similar nature.

Three things are worth noting.

Firstly, at the time of Kosovo's declaration of independence (and subsequent recognition by most countries in the west), - despite strongly, indeed, vehemently dissenting - Russia actually did nothing, at least militarily, as earlier it had done nothing in response to the "colour" revolutions in both Georgia and Ukraine.

The west blithely assumed that this policy of Russia registering diplomatic disapproval (while doing nothing about it) would continue, and that, therefore, Russia could be safely ignored.

Secondly, again, at the time, Russia's strong protests were assumed to have been expressed because Russia (historically) was a strong supporter of Serbia, (common Orthodox religious cultures, and Slavic identities among other things serving to cement this, along with Serbia's ardent anti-fascist role during WW2), and Serbia, frankly, didn't matter: For one thing, the Balkan war of the 1990s had left Serbia disgraced, Serbia had subsequently started (and lost) an ugly war with Kosovo, and, above all, because Muslim Kosovo loathed Serbia and - de facto - was, to all intents and purposes an independent entity by then, or, at the very least, was one not governed from, or remotely answerable to, Belgrade.

Now, Russia did step up its diplomatic efforts, and passionately argued against (and lobbied strongly against) the idea of extending NATO membership to both Georgia and Ukraine.

The closest both countries came to achieving this was when the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008 (the date is not a coincidence) did discuss (and this was an item formally included on the agenda) drawing up a MAP (Membership Action Plan - i.e. a road-map to eventual membership of NATO) for both Georgia and Ukraine.

President George W Bush argued strongly in favour of this proposal; Germany was uncomfortable - whereas France (who had been lobbied passionately by Russia) was decidedly unenthusiastic. After some discussion, it was decided to defer further consideration of the matter.

Then, of course, later that year, as summer approached autumn, the world economic crash happened. The other thing that happened was the Russian Georgian conflict (which Georgia started, by the way, although they had been provoked by Russia), leading to the divided and paralysed state we see there today, where Russia occupies (and supports) what were formerly two regions of Georgia, namely South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.

And this brings me to the third thing of importance - by far the most important matter - arising from the recognition of Kosovo: This was the first time since 1945 in Europe that a functioning state was carved up, dismembered, divided, split, against its will.

Thus, the principle of of dismembering a state (a functioning, stable, peaceful, even a democratic state, a sovereign state) - irrespective of the wishes of that state - was established.

And we - that is, the west - did it.

We handed that card to the Russians - they would never have played it first - but, having played it ourselves, it is difficult to replace it in the pack, and even more difficult to attempt to argue that this is perfectly okay for us to do this, but that this is something that should not be attempted by others.

And the Russians have been playing it - with striking success - ever since.

In Ukraine itself, unfortunately, the tragedy is that the state failed - failed utterly - to integrate its two cultures, as each manifestly despised the other, and equally, it failed to construct some sort of cultural and political architecture which would allow for the claiming of, expression of (and respect for) multiple, or several, identities.

There was a time when a federal - or confederated - form of political architecture might have worked, but - personally, and I regret having to say this - I think that the time for that has passed.

If what you suggest comes to pass and we end up with two Ukraines, perhaps we should go ahead and include "Western Ukraine" in the alliance. Again, Putin would throw a fit, but doing nothing will probably ensure that in ten years there won't be a "Western Ukraine" either. It'll be all Putin's, and he'll be on NATO's doorstep anyway. If we take the initiative and admit Ukraine (or whatever's left of it), Putin has nobody to blame but himself. He could've left well enough alone, but noooooo...

Admitting "west Ukraine" (to NATO or the EU) is not something "we", or "the west" will be able to do unless and until the boundaries (borders? That word is not used in situations where where the boundaries/borders are a matter of dispute) that define a "west" Ukraine are not just agreed, but acknowledged and recognised by that "west" Ukraine. (And by the international bodies - such as NATO - extending such invitations).

Neither the EU nor NATO will admit, will ever admit, - will even begin to contemplate admitting - a state with disputed boundaries/borders. The boundaries/borders will have to be agreed - and formally internationally recognised (both de jure and de facto, in other words) - by all parties.

And that is the twisted beauty of the contents of the poisoned chalice that I believe that Mr Putin is busily brewing.

A future 'west' Ukraine could only ever join NATO on the condition of recognising that 'east' Ukraine has all of the rights that this (putative) 'west' Ukraine claims; and such conditions would also apply to NATO. Accepting 'west' Ukraine would mean recognising 'east' Ukraine.