Two part series in the CSM on how the Taliban managed their comeback. Good read, but you can't tell me that US and allied intel and so the Pentagon weren't aware of the creeping losses in the north --even if they didn't know whether the Taliban would or could pull off a final call to arms and make hay off a swift rout there to parlay that into intimidating regular Afghan army members in the cities that still had more actual support from the US near the end.
Guess it felt more feasible to the Pentagon to keep on trying to kick the can down the road than cop to defeat. Overdid it this time though, and the Trump admin deciding to sit down w/ the Taliban at a table sans the puppet government was an admission of that defeat, more or less.
The Taliban’s homegrown strategy took advantage of intimidation, official corruption, and extensive networking to roll up the Afghan countryside.
www.csmonitor.com
The Taliban path to victory in Kabul ran through northern Afghanistan where a decadelong strategy of recruiting ethnic minorities paid off.
www.csmonitor.com
Heh. Somewhere I remember reading that the Pashto word for "cousin" is the same as for "enemy". The Taliban, however, has managed to overcome at least temporarily certain aspects of close-kin and tribalistic feuding by appealing to jihadism as a form of religious commonality instead. Worked for them, for now. But it didn't happen without money. They're going to run short without all the graft off what the US was plugging in.
That may only exacerbate resumption of the civil war... or it may inspire a new round of strange bedfellows in support of a "central" government that various countries would like to do business with in Afghanistan. But the Taliban leadership as well as those prospsective investors are rightly wary of Taliban mid-level enforcers reverting to behavior like they had displayed in ruling Afghanistan from 1996-2001. Doing that again would spook both China and Pakistan, the latter of which almost certainly values commerce w/ China more than it does continuing to back Afghan fundamentalists (even if Pakistan, like Saudi Arabia, has a certain requirement to tap dance around its own fundamentalist adherents and clerics).