Afghanistan (Again)

There has to be somewhere in the middle we could have landed. We have the superior military. We could have provided security around our own damn airbase at a minimum. We could have kept the Taliban out of Kabul and Bagram until we evacuated those who needed it. Then pulled out of Kabul and spent the next couple of months getting the weapons out of the country.
…and then Afghanistan would be in Taliban hands anyway, and I dare say the contents of your linked article would have been for all intents and purposes the same.

This “evacuated those who needed it” sure sounds good. A bit vague, though. Maybe it’s just me, but I don’t think many would be happy with the actual definition of “those who needed it”, whatever it may be…
 
There has to be somewhere in the middle we could have landed. We have the superior military. We could have provided security around our own damn airbase at a minimum. We could have kept the Taliban out of Kabul and Bagram until we evacuated those who needed it. Then pulled out of Kabul and spent the next couple of months getting the weapons out of the country.
Agreed.
I too would like to know more about the rationale behind leaving Bagram early.
And again, agreed.
…and then Afghanistan would be in Taliban hands anyway, and I dare say the contents of your linked article would have been for all intents and purposes the same.

This “evacuated those who needed it” sure sounds good. A bit vague, though. Maybe it’s just me, but I don’t think many would be happy with the actual definition of “those who needed it”, whatever it may be…

Well, we can start with a somewhat more refined, or precisely defined, list.

Personally, I would suggest something along the lines of...

Evacuating, and subsequently giving/granting full rights of residence and asylum/sanctuary/residence/citizenship to those Afghans, who were (and are):

Anyone (that is, anyone Afghan) who worked for, or with, the western military; western police missions; international (i.e. mostly western) organisations (EU, UN); international embassies; international NGOs; women's organisations with links to (or funded by) international bodies; journalists with links to (or funded by) international - western - bodies.

And none of those horrid and hideous exclusion clauses that because someone worked for "contractors", or, worse, international sub-contractors, that they aren't eligible for such support.

Now, that is a different debate, but I do think it is high time that this ghastly model of (often unaccountable to parliamentary or legislative oversight) "contractors" is critically examined a lot more closely, - which is something that I, for one, would love to see happen - and subject to much closer scrutiny and oversight. And control.

And yes, this also means eventual (if not immediate) similar rights for their families.

Admittedly, that is a quite a considerable number of people, but aiding them, assisting them, and enabling their escape/evacuation from current conditions in Afghanistan is the right and proper, ethical and moral thing to do; in addition, it is also the correct and the professional thing to do.
 
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FFS if true

https://www.twitter.com/i/web/status/1427973568630083587/

SOMEBODY needs to write US and so many others a check.

In hundred dollar bills that might weigh 3726lbs or more than a ton & a half in bags. 👀

Added

https://www.twitter.com/i/web/status/1428000701418983436/
Imo our “partners” in charge of Afghanistan were corrupt. They made assurances that were completely without merit, ie we will fight for our country. Yes, many well meaning people put their faith in the US, but how far can this take us and them?

Sure with $ x trillions more, we could keep carrying this country forever, *IF* we could afford it, while we can’t hardly even get a frick’n infrastructure bill passed here, so would it have been in our best interests to keep investing there? It obvious in hindsight of US trained Afghan troops defecting in mass, this was a waste of our time, money, and blood. …and we are not colonialists.

I missed Biden’s address today, what did I miss?
 
There has to be somewhere in the middle we could have landed. We have the superior military. We could have provided security around our own damn airbase at a minimum. We could have kept the Taliban out of Kabul and Bagram until we evacuated those who needed it. Then pulled out of Kabul and spent the next couple of months getting the weapons out of the country.
That would have required an acceptance in advance that as soon as we left, the country would fall immediately. Now if they had preceded on this basis, and knew this would happen, then they blew it big time. There might have been better ways.

But you have to remember that Trump drew down our presence dramatically during his term to something like 3k troops? It would have been reversing the flow dramatically to pump in tens of thousands of more troops to evacuate, but I’m not saying that would have been impossible. And there were supposed to be 300k Afghan troops trained and on line. Haha fool’d us. 🤬

The military leadership had to be involved in these decisions. How much misplaced confidence did they have in the Afghan military? This could be a case of historic misplaced trust. I’d love to hear the military leadership’s input on this topic.
 
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That would have required an acceptance in advance that as soon as we left, the country would fall immediately. Now if they had preceded on this basis, and knew this would happen, then they blew it big time. There might have been better ways.

But you have to remember that Trump drew down our presence dramatically during his term To something like 3k troops? It would have been reversing the flow dramatically to pump in tens of thousands of more troops to evacuate, but I’m not saying that would have been impossible. And there were supposed to be 300k Afghan troops trained and on line. Haha. The military leadership had to be involved in these decisions. How much misplaced confidence did they have in the Afghan military?
No, it wouldn't, not necessarily.

It would simply mean ensuring that those who worked with us would be made safe - and, in this instance, "safe" means evacuated, and given asylum and sanctuary and full citizenship rights - and should not have their lives threatened for having done so.

That is entirely separate from any departure, irrespective of whether such a (precipitate) departure is long anticipated, meticuously planned, or swift, sudden, or surreptitious, and carried out under cover of darkness.

This is not a new position with me. In other words, it long predates my time in Afghanistan - though I also hold this belief strongly from my time there.

Rather, it is one I have held strongly - and I am sure that @JamesMike will agree with me - ever since I first started in such international work, in my case, elections (when I supervised and ran elections, in Bosnia, in conjunction with local staff, and later, with a different mandate, observed international elections) in Bosnia in 1997, when the first post war elections were held, and when my own staff were - at times - under threat.

From that time, - ever since that time - I have been aware of two things: Firstly, the astonishing calibre and quality of much - if not most, almost all - of our local staff - enthusiastic, engaged, educated, idealistic, informed, decent, generous, (with their time, their insights, their advice, their thoughts), exceptionally hard-working, extraordinarily courageous, and deeply committed to anything which might improve life, and conditions of living, in their own country. Invariably, they were many of the best of their own people.

And secondly, I was also numbly aware that I would be flown home - evacuated rapidly and effectively if necessary (as happened once in Kyrgyzstan when post election demonstrations appeared - or threatened - to turn violent) - while my local staff would or could get it in the neck, if local conditions turned nasty, sour or ugly after - or, in the wake of - our departure.
 
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My wife said an expert on MSNBC this morning said
  • that 6 months ago, the US Govt told the Afghan Govt we were leaving, they said no problem.
  • that when the US shutdown it’s checkpoints instead of the Afghan military it was Taliban who showed up to take over.
  • that The US Air Base was huge and hard to defend and it was calculated that the city airport would be easier to defend and it would be easier to get more people out from that location.
  • and finally on the first day of the ball being in the Afghan military’s court, half the military walked.
As a principle, after 20 years, it’s hard to argue the US did not give it a good try. And if you want to criticize the US for bailing on Afghanistan have at it. If you want to praise the US for finally cutting its losses, you can do that too. Once it became apparent that Afghanistan was going to fall, it was going to be a mess. You can be mad at Biden, or be made at the Afghan military for falling on its swords or worse being traitors their government. Now I guess there is a lot of room here to debate just how worthy the Afghanistan Govt/Military was. :unsure:
 
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There has to be somewhere in the middle we could have landed. We have the superior military. We could have provided security around our own damn airbase at a minimum. We could have kept the Taliban out of Kabul and Bagram until we evacuated those who needed it. Then pulled out of Kabul and spent the next couple of months getting the weapons out of the country.
If we had the superior military, blah blah blah, why were we still fighting after 25 years? Why hadn’t we just won and straightened everything out?

You can’t just land multiple (large) planes in the middle of a field.

Maybe Pompeo shouldn’t have made the deal with the Taliban.
 
No, it wouldn't, not necessarily.

It would simply mean ensuring that those who worked with us would be made safe - and, in this instance, "safe" means evacuated, and given asylum and sanctuary and full citizenship rights - and should not have their lives threatened for having done so.

That is entirely separate from any departure, irrespective of whether such a (precipitate) departure is long anticipated, meticuously planned, or swift, sudden, or surreptitious, and carried out under cover of darkness.

This is not a new position with me.

Rather, it is one I have held strongly - and I am sure that @JamesMike will agree with me - ever since I first started in international work, in my case, elections (when I supervised and ran elections, and later, with a different mandate, observed international elections) in Bosnia in 1997, when the first post war elections were held, and when my own staff were - at times - under threat.

From that time, - ever since that time - I have been aware of two things: Firstly, the astonishing calibre and quality of much - if not most, almost all - of our local staff - enthusiastic, engaged, educated, idealistic, informed, decent, generous, (with their time, their insights, their advice, their thoughts), exceptionally hard-working, extraordinarily courageous, and deeply committed to anything which might improve life, and conditions of living, in their own country. Invariably, they were many of the best of their own people.

And secondly, I was also numbly aware that I would be flown home - evacuated rapidly and effectively if necessary (as happened once in Kyrgyzstan when post election demonstrations appeared - or threatened - to turn violent) - while my local staff would or could get it in the neck, if local conditions turned sour or ughly after - or, in the wake of - our departure.
Imo, they would have had to 1) accepted that Afghanistan would have fallen and advertised that to those working with us. 2) Pumped up the US Air base substantially with troops and arms. 3) Call in all vested personal to that Airbase in advance. If I understand it accurately, under Trump control of countryside was handed over to whoever wanted it, making it very difficult to freely travel.

Now I am not privy to the behind the scenes decisions. If the US military had advised Biden to expect the worst, than the plan I described seems reasonable. If they had planned on a force of 300k Afghan military to be functional, then this is a case where the team we put our trust in folded before the fight even got started. Yes, there is some blame there, depending on how you want to parse it,
 
Imo, they would have had to 1) accepted that Afghanistan would have fallen and advertised that to those working with us. 2) Pumped up the US Air base substantially with troops and arms. 3) Call in every vested personal to that Airbase in advance. If I understand it accurately, under Trump control of countryside was handed over to whoever wanted it, making it very difficult to freely travel.

Now I am not privy to the behind the scenes decisions. If the US military had advised Biden to expect the worst, than the plan I described seems reasonable. If they had planned on a force of 300k Afghan military to be functional, then this is a case wear the team we put our trust in folded before the fight even got started. Yes, there is some blame there, depending on how you want to parse it,
No.

To my mind, they are two wholly different, distinct and separate things.

You can guarantee - and insist on - and should insist on - ensuring the safety and security of those who worked with you without (simultaneously) appearing to suggest that the state will collapse, or that you expect, assume, or are planning for its collapse.

You owe them a duty of care.

People who worked for you - and with you - in good faith should not have to pay for that with their lives.

And this is something that applies - irrespective of whether the Kabul administration would have lasted one week, one year, that notorious 90 days, or the proverbial forever and a day - after the departure of the US security umbrella.
 
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There has to be somewhere in the middle we could have landed. We have the superior military. We could have provided security around our own damn airbase at a minimum. We could have kept the Taliban out of Kabul and Bagram until we evacuated those who needed it. Then pulled out of Kabul and spent the next couple of months getting the weapons out of the country.

While I have a real problem with the framing that Biden made America look weak, I agree that the U.S. military should have maintained Kabul and Bagram. I was really surprised that we just exfiltrated from Bagram so quickly considering how essential the airfield has been for so long, and how it would help support our efforts to move people out.

I think the real question is why didn't the intelligence services undersell

And, no politico is going to support the current situation in Afghanistan, so it's unsurprising to see the criticism. It was obviously a mess, and it's easy to point at the Biden administration and blame them, rather than for example, Germans considering how the Bush administration got them tied into the mess in the first place, and how after losing 60 soldiers, it all fell right back to the Taliban. Everyone's frustrated, and the Biden administration is the scapegoat.

That said, they screwed this up, having failed to consider that the Taliban would exploit last year's negotiations, and have a plan to snap people into place to blunt the Taliban's advance if the Afghan Army collapsed.
 
…and then Afghanistan would be in Taliban hands anyway, and I dare say the contents of your linked article would have been for all intents and purposes the same.

This “evacuated those who needed it” sure sounds good. A bit vague, though. Maybe it’s just me, but I don’t think many would be happy with the actual definition of “those who needed it”, whatever it may be…

There are reports filtering into social media now of people having been helicoptered out of Afghanistan from points outside the Kabul airport. Most likely there are other such evacuation efforts of which we're generally not aware at this time. It's more important that the extractions occur than that we know about them in real time.

The less known of such efforts at the time of occurrence, the less risk of local hostilities, even if the Taliban and US / allies have agreed on such endeavors in general or at certain locations. Taliban leaders know they essentially only have loyalty from (and not necessarily actual control over) whomever they most recently gifted enough dough or weapons to strike a bargain.
 
There are reports filtering into social media now of people having been helicoptered out of Afghanistan from points outside the Kabul airport. Most likely there are other such evacuation efforts of which we're generally not aware at this time. It's more important that the extractions occur than that we know about them in real time.

Most likely the French and British rescuing their citizens.
 
Very interesting thread by Olivia Troye (former WH advisor to Pence re homeland security counterterrorism issues, and who resigned her post primarily over administration's handling of Covid-19). She comments on behind-scenes events during Trump administration with respect to advance planning for visas and departure assistance for people who assisted our troops and media as translators, fixers, drivers. No surprise that the infamous Stephen Miller threw tantrums about any attempts getting them special visas. Anyway her thread is 7 tweets worth the reading...

https://www.twitter.com/i/web/status/1428740865665679361/
 
Very interesting thread by Olivia Troye (former WH advisor to Pence re homeland security counterterrorism issues, and who resigned her post primarily over administration's handling of Covid-19). She comments on behind-scenes events during Trump administration with respect to advance planning for visas and departure assistance for people who assisted our troops and media as translators, fixers, drivers. No surprise that the infamous Stephen Miller threw tantrums about any attempts getting them special visas. Anyway her thread is 7 tweets worth the reading...

https://www.twitter.com/i/web/status/1428740865665679361/
What a brain-dead tweet from Meghan McCain’s husband. Trump promised all troops in Afghanistan would be home for Christmas 2020… and never followed through. His supporters never called him on it though.

“Trump would have done X better” has less than 1% chance of being true.
 
What a brain-dead tweet from Meghan McCain’s husband. Trump promised all troops in Afghanistan would be home for Christmas 2020… and never followed through. His supporters never called him on it though.

“Trump would have done X better” has less than 1% chance of being true.

Trump understood optics all right, but only as they applied to him and at a given moment. He had zero concerns in leaving a trail of broken promises and related damage or destruction behind him, it's why he had such a raft of lawyers in his serially mismanaged businesses.

He took the same approach into the White House but instead of downstream lawyers, he relied on Barr at the top of DoJ for that stuff and otherwise just planted agency lackeys who would undermine any policy or process he had indicated he didn't like.

On top of that, Trump didn't pay attention to what his hand-picked "acting deputy yada-yadas" were doing, so they were all free to try to implement their own agendas while they were at it.
 
Two part series in the CSM on how the Taliban managed their comeback. Good read, but you can't tell me that US and allied intel and so the Pentagon weren't aware of the creeping losses in the north --even if they didn't know whether the Taliban would or could pull off a final call to arms and make hay off a swift rout there to parlay that into intimidating regular Afghan army members in the cities that still had more actual support from the US near the end.

Guess it felt more feasible to the Pentagon to keep on trying to kick the can down the road than cop to defeat. Overdid it this time though, and the Trump admin deciding to sit down w/ the Taliban at a table sans the puppet government was an admission of that defeat, more or less.


Most Taliban come from rural villages, where they are members of the same tribal clans and subclans as government officials and military commanders – making them relatives or neighbors. Starting at the district level, they created shadow governments and militaries in every province. Then they offered deals to switch sides.

“About a year ago, the Taliban started reaching out to lower-level government troops and fighters, offering money for their weapons and to abandon their posts. And then they ratcheted up the process to reach more senior provincial leaders,” says Mr. London.

The Taliban’s control over rural areas, which had grown steadily since the U.S. military handed over security to Afghan forces in 2014, rose dramatically as U.S. forces began their final pullout this summer. In one month, from June to July, the number of districts under Taliban control doubled from 104 to 216, according to tracking by the Long War Journal.

Many elite forces, including Afghan special forces and paramilitary units such as that under Mr. Hanif, did fight until the last possible moment. Unlike the regular army, these units were organized largely along community and tribal lines, with elders vetting new recruits.

“They have kind of an obligation to one another,” says Mr. London, author of “The Recruiter,” a book about the CIA’s post-2001 transformation. “Given their reputation after years of bleeding the Taliban ... such troops realized that surrender was less likely to be an option and amnesty highly unlikely,” he says.

Mr. Hanif had to fight his way out of Kunar and is on the run. “We will fight until our last breath,” he said in his last phone call.


When the Taliban last ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s, they faced stiff resistance across the country’s north from ethnic-based paramilitaries that resented the southern Pashtun militants. That resistance would prove decisive in 2001 when the same ethnic minorities, backed by U.S. air power, ousted the Taliban regime in Kabul.

This time around, the Taliban had a new strategy: Enlist minorities in the north and turn a Pashtun-based insurgency into a pan-Islamic fighting force against foreign infidels.

Taliban commanders and fighters describe a decadelong effort to recruit among ethnic minorities, setting the stage for a lightning-fast victory over Afghan security forces in city after city, until Kabul capitulated on Sunday.

Mr. Aleem, who wears a brown silk turban favored by Uzbeks, says the Taliban created a cadre of local leaders who were routinely sent to Pakistan for religious and military training.

“After 2008, the recruitment of young men from villages began in religious schools, which led the Taliban to have a mobile force among the people ... at a very low cost. It grew deep roots inside the indigenous people,” he told The Christian Science Monitor a week ago, before the Taliban took Kabul.

Mr. Aleem says he made three trips to Pakistan where, in addition to a religious curriculum, he studied battlefield tactics such as how to build roadside bombs. “Those who were educated in Pakistan played a key role in advancing the Taliban’s attacks.”

The Taliban’s recruitment of ethnic Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tajik Afghans under a broader pan-Islamic banner was sweetened with promises of all-expenses-paid religious education in Pakistan – and a chance of martyrdom. Along with Islamic jurisprudence, these northern recruits learned guerrilla war tactics and skills, before returning home to serve as local Taliban leaders.

The Taliban’s unlikely path to victory through the north reflects a deep understanding of local grievances, analysts say. Not only did the militants tap into a growing Islamic and political radicalization, but they also took full advantage of deepening complaints over corruption, incompetence, and unpopular leadership appointments by the U.S.-backed Afghan government in Kabul.

“The ethnic minorities were deeply alienated. ... I can’t stress enough the effect this had on the north,” says Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, a political scientist at the University of Pittsburgh who has studied Afghan governance.

This provided fertile ground for indoctrination of minority youth via Taliban-controlled madrassas in the north and in Pakistan.

“You need something to fight for, not just fight against. And there was no vision from the central government that they could believe in,” says Ms. Murtazashvili. The Taliban provided a pan-Islamic banner for the north that could transcend its Pashtun roots.

Heh. Somewhere I remember reading that the Pashto word for "cousin" is the same as for "enemy". The Taliban, however, has managed to overcome at least temporarily certain aspects of close-kin and tribalistic feuding by appealing to jihadism as a form of religious commonality instead. Worked for them, for now. But it didn't happen without money. They're going to run short without all the graft off what the US was plugging in.

That may only exacerbate resumption of the civil war... or it may inspire a new round of strange bedfellows in support of a "central" government that various countries would like to do business with in Afghanistan. But the Taliban leadership as well as those prospsective investors are rightly wary of Taliban mid-level enforcers reverting to behavior like they had displayed in ruling Afghanistan from 1996-2001. Doing that again would spook both China and Pakistan, the latter of which almost certainly values commerce w/ China more than it does continuing to back Afghan fundamentalists (even if Pakistan, like Saudi Arabia, has a certain requirement to tap dance around its own fundamentalist adherents and clerics).
 
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